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In this paper we compare the distributions of ADR returns and the returns of the locally traded shares 
between Chile and Argentina. This comparison is interesting because both countries are emerging 
economies with a similar free market orientation. Both countries have similar free market orientation, but 
they differ in two important respects: (1) exchange rate regime and (2) restrictions to foreign investments. 
We find several differences between the two economies. Consistent with previous research, we find that the 
volatility of ADR returns tends to be higher than the return volatility of the underlying securities. We also 
find that the return distributions of Chilean ADRs are significantly different from the distributions of the 
returns on the respective underlying Chilean s hares. The results reveal that while the mean returns are the 
same, the return standard deviations are significantly different. In contrast, Argentinean ADRs and their 
respective underlying shares tend to have the same distribution of returns. Finally, we  employ a threshold 
model to estimate the transaction cost of trading the ADRs and the locally traded shares. We find that 
transaction costs that must be added to the returns difference before arbitrage is possible are between 1% 
and 2% for Chilean ADRs, and slightly lower  - 0.66% to 1.65% for Argentinean ADRs. We also find that 
the daily return differential reversion caused by arbitrage activities is around 30% for Chilean ADRs and 
40% for  Argentinean ADRs. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Over the l ast three decades many countries have opened their physical and financial 
markets for foreign investment. This process, labeled in the literature the process of markets 
globalization, included the easing of various markets restrictions on capital flows from one 
country to another. During this period, the growth of the market for American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs) has exploded. 
ADRs are negotiable certificates traded in the U.S. financial markets; they simply 
represent the shares of foreign country firms. A merican commercial banks serve as the 
depository units for the ADRs. Thus, although trading ADRs in the U.S. is U.S. dollar 
denominated, it should be equivalent to trading the foreign firms’ shares without actually 
trading them in their respective local markets. 
The market for ADRs has been developed for various reasons most of which are 
analyzed in the literature. Value maximization, diversification, investor recognition and 
overcoming market segmentation, to name a few. Price and return reaction to cross market 
listing, possible arbitrage opportunities and the difference between ADR returns and the 
returns on their local counterpart shares are some of the issues raised by many researchers. 
For an excellent review of this growing body of literature see Karolyi (1998).  
Most studies on the benefits of cross listing have found a positive stock price reaction 
as well as a decline in the cost of capital. See Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan (1987), 
Domowitz, Glen and Mahavan (1997a), Miller (1998), Jayaraman, Shastri and Tandon 
(1998) and Forester and Karolyi (1999). Officer and Hoffmeister (1987) and Wahab and 
Khandwala (1993) found that ADRs present investors with an excellent diversification 
opportunity, while studies by Maldonado and Saunders (1983), Kato, Linn and Schallheim 
(1991), Park and Tavakkol (1994), Miller and Morey (1996) and Karolyi and Stulz (1996)   3
concluded that ADRs do not present any arbitrage opportunities. The only study that did find 
some arbitrage opportunities is by Wahab, Lashgari and Cohn (1992). 
In the absence of direct or indirect trading barriers, there should not exist significant 
differences between the return distribution of locally traded shares and that of the U.S. traded 
ADR. That is, ADRs and their underlying shares are expected to be perfect substitutes and no 
arbitrage opportunities should be present. Many researchers write about the issue of 
international barriers to trading, investments and cash flows movements. Stulz (1981) 
develops a model of investment with international b arriers. Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) 
describe many of the barriers that existed at that time. More recently, Stulz and Wasserfallen 
(1995) analyze a case of market segmentation in Switzerland, and Domowitz, Glen and 
Madhavan (1997b) develop a model of market segmentation based on cash flows restrictions. 
Two possible sources of differences between the return of locally traded shares and 
the ADR returns  are transaction costs and the distribution of the foreign exchange rate 
between the U.S. and the firm’s  country. If transaction costs in the U.S. market are smaller 
than those in the local market because of higher liquidity, for example, it is possible that 
returns will be distributed differently. Also, in order to put both distributions on the same 
footing, one might translate the local market prices to U.S. dollars. In this case, the 
distribution of the foreign exchange may influence the behavior of the resulting distribution. 
Park and Tavakkol (1994) find that returns on Japanese ADRs are not significantly different 
from the returns on the underlying shares traded in Japan. They also report that the return 
volatility of ADRs is larger than the underlying shares volatility. They find, however, that 
this larger volatility is the result of currency return’s volatility and the covariance between 
the stock and the currency returns.  
In this paper we compare the distributions of ADR returns and the returns of the 
locally traded shares between Chile and Argentina. This comparison is interesting because   4
both countries are emerging economies with a similar free market orientation. They differ, 
however, in two important respects. While Chile maintains its own currency, the Chilean 
peso (CLP), and still imposes several cash flows restrictions on foreign investments, the 
Argentinean government has implemented a successful currency board, fixing the 
Argentinean Peso (ARS) to the U.S. dollar and removing all impediments to foreign 
investments and cash flow movements. Therefore, an analysis of distributional similarities 
and differences between their respective ADRs returns and the returns on the locally traded 
shares may shed some light on the relationship between ADR returns and cash flow 
restrictions, foreign exchange rates as well as transaction costs. 
In the analysis we  find several differences between the two economies. Consistent 
with previous research, we find that the volatility of ADR returns tends to be higher than the 
return volatility of the underlying securities. We then use the method for testing the 
simultaneous equality of means and variances suggested by Bradley and Blackwood (1989) 
and tested with financial data by Owen and Rabinovitch (1999). Here we find the main 
difference between the returns on stocks in the two countries and the returns on their ADRs. 
The general finding is that the return distributions of Chilean ADRs are significantly different 
from the distributions of the returns on the respective underlying Chilean shares. The results 
reveal that while the mean returns are the same, the return standard deviations are 
significantly different. As mentioned above, they are larger for the ADR returns than for the 
returns on locally traded stocks. In contrast, Argentinean ADRs and their respective 
underlying shares tend to have the same distribution of returns. Finally, we employ a 
threshold model proposed by Tsay (1989), and implemented by Prakash and Taylor (1998), 
to estimate the transaction cost of trading the ADRs and the locally traded shares. We find 
that transaction costs that must be added to the returns difference before arbitrage is possible 
are between 1% and 2% for Chilean ADRs, and slightly lower  - 0.66% to 1.65% for   5
Argentinean ADRs. We also find that the daily return differential reversion caused by 
arbitrage activities is around 30% for Chilean ADRs and 40% for  Argentinean ADRs. 
  This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the data and presents univariate 
statistics. Section III compares return distributions based on the tail behavior of the returns, 
mean returns and return volatility. Section IV estimates the transaction costs implied by a 
threshold arbitrage model and discusses the impact of capital flow restrictions on arbitrage 
opportunities and transaction costs. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. The Data 
The data analyzed in this paper are the daily returns on six locally traded firms from 
Argentina and fourteen locally traded firms from Chile and their respective NYSE traded 
ADRs. The sample periods are different for the different firms, depending on the dates that 
ADRs  started trading on these firms on the NYSE. Table 1 presents the data. Notice that in 
all cases the sample size is relatively. Table 2 exhibits several univariate characteristics of the 
data. Note that the high kurtosis values in all cases indicates that t he returns’ distribution is 
non normal. Also, the extreme values, to be analyzed further in the next section,  of the left 
tail tend to be larger in the ADR market. This occurs in four out of the six cases of the firms 
from Argentina and eleven out of the fourteen firms from Chile. The right tail extreme values 
tend to be larger than the left tail extreme values in both the local and the ADR markets. The 
indication is that the distributions of the returns on the locally traded firms and their 
corresponding ADRs may differ in the tails.   
 
 
III. A Comparison of Return Distributions. 
In this section we use several statistical tests in order to compare the return 
distributions of the locally traded stocks and their ADRs across the two countries. Following   6
the last remarks in Section II we begin with an analysis of the distributions tails. We then test 
for equality of the distributions based on the Kolmogorov  – Smirnov (KS) distribution test. 
This test indicates that in most cases the return distributions for the Argentinean firms are 
equal across markets, while they are not equal for most Chilean firms. We then test for a joint 
means and standard deviations of the distributions. Again, the results suggest distribution 
equality for firms from Argentina. For Chilean firms, the mean returns are equal across 
markets, but the return standard deviations for ADRs are larger than for locally traded shares.  
 
III.A.  The Return Distributions’ Tails 
Harvey (1995a, 1995b) and Claessens, Dasgupta and Glen (1995) document that 
stock returns in emerging markets indexes significantly depart from normality. As mentioned 
above, we confirm this result for individual firms in Table 2. The high excess kurtosis forces 
a rejection of normality for all the firms in both countries under the traditional Jarque-Bera 
normality test. This departure from normality is greatly influenced by the behavior of 
extreme returns. Susmel (2000) argues that the main difference between stock returns in 
emerging markets and well-established markets is the behavior of the returns on the tails of 
the distribution, especially on the left tail. We emphasize the latter result because the left tail 
behavior is probably the most relevant for money managers that have to comply with value-
at-risk requirements. 
  We wish to test the behavior of returns on the ADRs and those on the locally listed 
shares on their distributions’ tails. To estimate the tails of the distributions, we use extreme 
value theory. Consider the stationary sequence  X 1, X 2,..Xn of i.i.d random variables with a 
distribution function F(.). We wish to find the probability that the maximum of the first n 
random variables, M n, is below a certain value x. We denote this probability by P(Mn<x) 
=F
n(x). M n could be multiplied by  -1 if one is interested in the minimum. The distribution   7
function F
n(x), when suitably normalized and for large n, converges to a limiting distribution 
G(x), where G(x) is one of three known asymptotic distributions, see Leadbetter, Lindgren and 
Rootzen (1983). Since returns on financial assets are fat tailed, Koedijk, Schafgans and De 
Vries (1990) consider the limiting distribution of G(x) which is characterized by a lack of some 
higher moments: 
 (1)    G(x)  = exp(-x)
-1/a = exp(-x)
-g,  if x > 0, 
    G(x)  = 0,        if  x £ 0. 
where g=1/a>0 and a is the tail index. Leadbetter, Lindgren and Rootzen (1983) show that when the 
dependence among the X i’s is not too strong, this limiting distribution is valid. The Student-t with 
finite degrees of freedom, the stable distribution, and the ARCH process are included in the above 
G(x) distribution. For the Student-t distribution,  a is the degrees of freedom. The symmetric stable 
distribution requires  a to be lower than two. The tail index  indicates the number of moments that 
exist.  
  To estimate g we use Hill’s(1975) moment estimator. We first obtain the order statistics X (n), 
X(n-1),..., X(1) from the sample, where X(n)>X(n-1)>...> X(1), etc. Then, the Hill estimator is given by:  
where m is the number of upper order statistics included. The Hill estimator can be applied to 
either tail of a distribution by calculating order statistics from the opposite tail and multiplying 
the data by -1. It is also possible to combine the tail observations by taking the absolute values 
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  Table 2 presents the estimates of the tails, using (2), along with their standard errors. 
The last two columns of Table 2 show the right tail estimate,  a+, and the left tail estimate, a-, 
respectively. First we note that the estimates for the firms in both countries are quite similar and 
with few exceptions, the estimates are between 2 and 3. Second, observe that the tails for both 
the local shares and their corresponding ADRs are symmetric. That is, the magnitudes of the 
left tail estimates are not significantly different from the magnitudes of the right tail estimates. 
Thirdly, the local shares do not have significantly different tails than their corresponding 
ADRs. In conclusion, the results so far, point out that the behavior of extreme values is similar 
in Chile and Argentina. Moreover, the distributions of the local shares and their corresponding 
ADRs, in both countries, are not different in the tails. 
 
III.B. The Return Distributions, their Means and Standard Deviations 
We begin this section with three non parametric tests whose results are shown in 
Table 3. The most important result is that, with only one exception, all the three tests  – 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, (KS) Wilcoxon rank sums (WS) and the value of the Median scores 
(MS)  – fail to reject the null hypothesis for the firms from Argentina. Note that the KS test 
rejects equality of distributions for only one firm from Argentina, namely, TGS. On the 
contrary, the KS test rejects equality of return distributions across markets for the 14 Chilean 
firms. On the other hand, the WS and MS location tests fail to reject the null for most Chilean 
firms. Thus, the differences found across markets for Chilean firms are related to the 
dispersion, but not to the location, of the return distributions.  
In order to further analyze the return distributions, we now employ the joint test 
of simultaneous means and variances equality. This test was suggested by Bradley and 
Blackwood (1989)  and applied to financial data by Owen and Rabinovitch (1999).  Let rj,   9
t denote the return on a stock traded in country j, j = Argentina, Chile, and rUS, t denote the 
return on the corresponding ADR, t = 1,2,….,T. Assume that the return distributions 
belong to the elliptical family. For further details, see Owen and Rabinovitch (1999) and 
the references therein. Next, define yt =  rAR, t - rUS, t  and xt =  rAR, t + rUS, t . Define DEVXt 
= x t - x .  Then, perform the following regression: 
(3) yt = b0 + b1 DEVXt + et.  
Regression (3) yields an F value and two t -values. The F value tests the null 
hypothesis that both the means and the variances are equal simultaneously. If the F -value is 
large, the Null hypothesis is rejected and the t -values can be used to test the equality of the 
means and the equality of the variances separately. Table 4 exhibits the results of these 
regressions. The table indicates the simultaneous equality of the mean returns and the returns 
variances for the Argentinean firms in all but one case. It also shows the equality of the mean 
returns for the Chilean firms. But for 9 out of the 14 firms from Chile we see that the 
volatility of ADR returns is significantly larger than the volatility of the returns on the locally 
traded shares. 
 
IV. Arbitrage, Transaction Costs and Threshold Models 
Arbitrage between two identical assets that trade in two different markets is very easy 
to implement when transaction costs are ignored. Simply start from an equilibrium situation, 
in which the prices in the two markets are equal. If during a certain time period, the asset’s 
price in market B becomes higher than the price in market A, arbitrageurs will buy the asset 
in market A and sell it in market B. Thus, during this time period the asset’s prices will adjust 
by increasing in market A and decreasing in market B until equilibrium is restored. As 
mentioned above, this traditional description of arbitrage ignores transaction costs.   10
Accounting for these costs, the price adjustment w ill occur only if the price differential is 
larger than the transaction costs faced by arbitrageurs. That is, the price adjustment 
mechanism is non-linear in nature.  
Heuristically, we can apply the above arbitrage mechanism to shares traded in two 
different markets: the local market and the ADR market. Let yt represent the difference 
between the local returns and the ADRs returns and let k measure the transaction costs faced 
by arbitrageurs. Suppose that arbitrageurs believe in a long-run arbitrage-free equilibrium 
between the local shares and the ADRs and assume that on a given day the local returns are 
larger than the ADR returns by more than the transaction costs associated with trading, i.e., yt 
> k. Then, arbitrageurs will have the incentive to invest in the ADR market and, therefore, 
will create a reversion to the long-run equilibrium situation. Under this dynamic behavior, the 
arbitrage adjustment mechanism between the local and ADR markets can be approximated by 
Tong’s (1983) threshold autoregressive (TAR) model: 
(4)    yt = aout + bout yt-1 + eout,t,   if |yt-1| > k, 
yt = ain + bin yt-1 + ein,t,              if |yt-1| < k,   
where bout measures the speed of convergence toward equilibrium. We assume e out,t follows a 
Normal distribution, N(0,s
2
out), and e in,t follows a Normal distribution, N(0,s
2
in). Since daily 
returns are on average very small, we assume aout = ain = 0.  
The first equation of  model (4) describes the behavior of the returns difference when 
there are arbitrage opportunities, because the return differential is greater that the transaction 
costs. Note that arbitrage predicts that bout should be negative. The second equation describes 
the behavior of the returns difference when there is no arbitrage opportunities. That is, 
equilibrium without  any arbitrage opportunities exists for all y t values in the interval [ -k,k], 
and not just at the point 0. Thus, inside this interval, there is no autoregressive behavior,   11
which implies  bin  = 0. Note that the above model assumes that arbitrageurs face symmetric 
transaction costs. 




in,  k. Following Fanizza (1990) and 
Balke and Fomby (1997), we use a best-fit grid search on the threshold parameter k. Here, we 
follow Fanizza’s (1990) approach to maximize the l ikelihood function. (Balke and Fomby 
(1997) minimize the residual sum of squares.) This approach is relatively simple, but 
simplicity is bought at a price: the parameter k is not identified under the Null hypothesis of 
no threshold. Moreover, the likelihood function is discontinuous and not well-behaved, and 
the use of a grid method to select k makes it impossible to report standard errors. The grid 
search is greatly simplified, however, by the implicit assumption in (3) of symmetric 
transaction costs.  
Before estimating model (4), we tested for general nonlinearities in the returns 
spreads between the local assets and their corresponding ADRs. We use the F-test proposed 
by Lukkonnen, R., P. Saikkonen, and T. Terarsvirta, (1988), which attempts to detect second-, third-, 
and fourth-order nonlinearity in an AR model. The last column of Table 5 reports these F-tests, LST-
F, and their corresponding p-values. The linearity assumption is strongly rejected in all cases. Based 
on this strong rejection of the standard AR model, then, we estimate the non-linear model based on 
(4). 
Table 5 also shows the estimates of the above model. The autoreggresive parameter, 
bout, is significant in all the cases.  For the case of the Argentinean firms, the estimates imply 
a significant next day return differential reversion toward equilibrium of around 40%. Note 
that the signs are negative as predicted by the arbitrage argument. The transaction costs are 
estimated to be between 0.66% and 1.63%. For the Chilean firms, the results are also 
consistent with model (4). The parameter  bout  is negative and statistically significant. The   12
estimates of the speed of adjustment, for all the cases, are around 30%. The Chilean 
transaction costs faced by arbitrageurs are estimated to be between .80% and 2%. 
 
IV. A   Discussion: Regulatory Time Constraints, Delays and the TAR  
Above, we estimate next day return differential reversions for Chilean and 
Argentinean cross-listed securities. However, for regulatory constrains in Chile, the 
mechanism involved in exploiting arbitrage opportunities across markets may involve a 
longer period. Let’s analyze the time periods involved in arbitrage operations for Chilean 
securities. Suppose the USD price of the locally traded stock is higher than the ADR price. 
Then, the international arbitrageur buys ADRs in the U.S. market and converts them into the 
underlying share. The custodian bank, representing the foreign investor, reports the ADR 
conversion to the Chilean central bank and requires approval for: 1.- exchanging into dollars 
the CLP proceeds from the sale of the shares in the local exchange and 2.- sending the dollar 
amount to the U.S. The central bank has up to seven days to process the paper work and 
approve the foreign exchange transaction. Once permission is given, the foreign investor is 
obliged to send abroad the dollars in a period no longer than five days. According to 
regulators, this process guaranties that foreign investors enter the local market for arbitrage 
reasons and not to perform speculative operations.
1 In addition, local investors are not 
permitted to perform arbitrage operations with ADRs. Table 6 presents a summary of the 
activities required to perform arbitrage along with the times and transaction costs involved. 
Now suppose the USD price of the locally traded share is lower than the ADR price. 
The arbitrageur is then interested in buying the local shares and converting them into ADRs. 
In this process, he needs the central bank’s approval for entering dollars into Chile. Thus, 
                                                                 
1 Before May 2000, foreign investors entering the Chilean market for speculative reasons 
were subject to the one-year minimum holding period.   13
international a rbitrage operations are subject to regulatory-induced time delays in both 
directions.   
Given the discussion above, adjustments to return differentials across markets may 
take place in more than one trading day. Therefore, we might be underestimating the speed of 
adjustment in (4). Observe in table 7 how some autocorrelations for the return difference 
series are significant beyond lag one. In order to accommodate price adjustment delays for 
regulatory time constraints in Chile, we may need to introduce longer memory to the 
TAR(p;n,d) model, by varying the autoregressive parameter, p, and the delay parameter, d 
(the number of thresholds, n, is equal to 1 in our model). We may need to introduce returns 
accumulated over a period of days. These extensions complicates the TAR estimation. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Over the last three decades many countries have opened their physical and 
financial markets for foreign investment. During this period, the growth  of the market for 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) has exploded. In this paper we compare the 
distributions of ADR returns and the returns of the locally traded shares between Chile 
and Argentina. This comparison is interesting because both countries are emerging 
economies with a similar free market orientation. They differ, however, in two important 
respects. While Chile maintains its own currency, the Chilean peso (CLP), and still 
imposes several cash flows restrictions on foreign investments, the Argentinean 
government has implemented a successful currency board, f ixing the Argentinean Peso 
(ARS) to the U.S. dollar and removing all impediments to foreign investments and cash 
flow movements.  In the analysis we find several differences between the two economies. 
Consistent with previous research, we find that the volatility of ADR returns tends to be   14
higher than the return volatility of the underlying securities. We also find that the return 
distributions of Chilean ADRs are significantly different from the distributions of the 
returns on the respective underlying Chilean shares. The results reveal that while the 
mean returns are the same, the return standard deviations are significantly different. In 
contrast, Argentinean ADRs and their respective underlying shares tend to have the same 
distribution of returns. Finally, we employ a threshold model proposed by Tsay (1989), 
and implemented by Prakash and Taylor (1998), to estimate the transaction cost of 
trading the ADRs and the locally traded shares. We find that transaction costs that must 
be added to the returns difference before arbitrage is possible are between 1% and 2% for 
Chilean ADRs, and slightly lower - 0.66% to 1.65% for Argentinean ADRs. We also find 
that the daily return differential reversion caused by arbitrage activities is around 30% for 
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TABLE 1. DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
 
Firm  Ticker 
symbol 
















   
Banco Frances   BFR  Banking  11/24/93-5/24/00  1,340  175,275  467,910 
Banco Rio de la Plata  BRS  Banking  10/10/97-5/24/00  2,380  53,300  46,494 
YPF S.A.  YPF  Oil & Gas Operator  07/07/93-5/24/00  12,200    760,912  69,240 
Telefonica de Argentina  TAR  Telecommunication  03/08/94-5/24/00  7,680  752,675  78,220 
Telecom Argentina STET  TEO  Telecommunication  12/09/94-5/24/00  2,180  2,500,506  3,430,048 
Transportadora de Gas S.A.  TGS  Gas & Oil Operation  11/17/94-5/24/00  1240  383,500  96,316 
 
CHILE 
   
Compañia Cervecerias  CU  Beverages  09/28/93-12/30/96  1,430  46,000  290,883 
Viña Concha y Toro  VCO  Alcoholic beverage  10/17/94-04/13/99  535.8  3,000  76,480 
Cristalerias de Chile  CGW  Glass products  04/13/90-04/13/99  369.3  13,000  224,958 
Compañia de Telecom. de Chile  CTC  Telecommunication  07/23/90-04/13/99  4,410  395,000  1,775,235 
Banco de A. Edwards  AED  Banking  11/06/95-04/13/99  493.4  64,000  216,570 
Empresa Nac. Elec.  (ENDESA)  EOC  Energy  07/28/94-04/13/99  3,200  142,000  3,103,186 
Enersis S.A.  ENI  Electric utility  10/21/93-04/13/99  2960  62,000  2,857,560 
Laboratorio Chile S.A.  LBC  Biothech  07/01/94-04/13/99  307.1  55,000  236,467 
Madeco S.A.  MAD  Misc. Fabric. Prods.  06/01/93-04/13/99  299.1  59,000  156,033 
Masisa S.A.  MYS  Constr. Supplies  06/18/93-04/13/99  353.7  95,000  247,357 
Administradora Fondos Provida  PVD  Insurance  4/17/94-04/13/99  5410  98,000  112,439 
Banco Santander Chile  BSB  Banking  11/15/94-04/13/99  1,720  328,000  225,613 
Soc. Quimica y Minera de Chile  SQM  Chemical Industry  09/22/93-04/13/99  278.4  16,000  659,501 
Santa Isabel  ISA  Retail (grocery)  08/01/95-04/13/99  195.2  28,000  259,095 
 
Notes: 
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TABLE 2. UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
Summary statistics for daily returns on locally traded stocks (L) and their NYSE ADRs (A). The calculated 
statistics are the mean, the standard deviation (SD), skewness coefficient (Skew), excess kurtosis (Kurt), 
maximum, fifth largest observation (max5), fifth lowest observation (min1), minimum, right tail  ( a+), and left 
tail (a-). 
 
Ticker  mean  SD  Skew  Kurt  max1  max5  min5  min1  a+  a- 
ARGENTINA 
L  .0151  3.142  0.445  6.962  27.764  11.821  -11.551  -16.246  3.739 (.44)#  2.303 (.23)  BFR 
A  -.0098  3.202  0.211  5.686  21.401  11.957  -12.411  -19.083  2.447 (.25)  2.614 (.46) 
L  -.0425  3.265  -0.494  5.976  15.749  9.531  -12.629  -17.451  2.298 (.38)  2.139 (.44)  BRS 
A  -.0384  3.477  -0.205  7.707  22.314  11.249  -11.912  -21.622  2.250 (.39)  3.327 (.76) 
L  .0428  2.041  0.329  7.299  15.864  9.215  -8.613  -12.613  2.521 (.30)  2.497 (.25)#  YPF 
A  .0337  2.110  0.219  6.337  15.141  9.531  -9.171  -12.143  2.058 (.19)  2.045 (.19) 
L  .0268  2.900  0.718  7.666  23.333  13.976  -10.629  -16.161  2.878 (.30)#  2.852  (.30)#  TAR 
A  .0255  2.948  -0.386  15.94  25.489  15.534  -9.704  -30.619  2.699 (.24)#  2.813 (.27)# 
L  -.0075  2.871  0.305  5.347  19.957  13.249  -10.500  -16.352  3.302 (.50)#  2.517# (.24)  TEO 
A  .0089  2.876  -0.012  4.889  18.999  12.527  -8.701  -17.638  2.605 (.31)  2.675 (.25)# 
L  .0214  2.267  -0.298  8.575  13.946  9.109  -8.516  -16.115  2.424 (.31)  2.645 (.61)  TGS 
A  .0266  2.292  -0.105  8.625  14.974  9.379  -8.311  -19.498  2.614 (.29)#  2.608 (.28)# 
CHILE  
L  0.048  2.139  0.909  10.261  14.835  9.589  -7.500  -12.289  2.215 (.31)  2.306 (.37)  CU 
A  0.049  2.259  1.006  8.108  14.286  12.069  -8.065  -11.856  2.767 (.40)  2.121 (.20) 
L  0.085  1.920  0.617  6.648  11.554  8.527  -6.081  -8.996  2.134 (.29)  2.172 (.29)  VCO 
A  0.068  2.143  0.2513  3.737  12.346  8.152  -7.910  -9.848  3.129 (.52)#  3.113 (51)# 
L  -0.018  2.180  0.560  10.348  16.818  7.234  -8.297  -12.037  2.602 (.34)  2.638 (.38)#  CGW 
A  -0.053  2.388  0.5426  8.794  20.588  8.451  -8.511  -11.236  2.713 (.43)  2.656  (.44) 
L  0.132  1.909  0.556  7.373  16.352  8.899  -7.809  -13.006  2.871 (.29)  2.845 (.25)#  CTC 
A  0.106  2.064  0.376  8.584  17.731  9.804  -8.295  -13.548  2.359 (.20)  2.185  (.21) 
L  -0.013  2.387  0.564  10.66  17.647  10.000  -9.343  -13.830  2.026 (.27)  1.688 (.18)  AED 
A  -0.013  2.598  -0.324  11.22  14.130  10.370  -10.256  -20.896  2.148 (.28)  2.157 (.45) 
L  -0.010  1.879  1.060  8.855  17.647  7.422  -6.061  -7.143  3.017 (.38)#  3.362 (.46)#  EOC 
A  -0.023  2.151  0.654  4.154  15.663  8.036  -7.059  -8.824  3.333 (.48)#  3.189 (.60)# 
L  0.041  2.035  0.678  4.529  14.894  8.000  -6.906  -8.333  3.747 (.50)#  2.874 (.29)#  ENI 
A  0.030  2.302  -.0593  6.235  13.740  8.671  -8.125  -18.443  2.735 (.43)  2.721 (.39)# 
L  0.0691  2.334  0.410  4.319  13.462  9.091  -7.813  -12.152  2.621 (.37)  2.598 (.34)  LBC 
A  0.0638  2.5138  0.509  7.87  18.333  10.377  -9.783  -15.190  2.267 (.25)  2.247 (.27) 
L  0.0003  2.6728  -0.437  10.056  17.682  9.259  -13.043  -19.318  2.293 (.28)  3.696 (1.39)  MAD 
A  -0.018  2.834  0.436  17.768  29.655  10.007  -11.286  -22.321  1.928 (.21)  2.582 (.54) 
L  -0.007  2.5524  0.759  6.897  18.750  10.811  -9.722  -11.765  2.652 (.26)  2.609 (.25)#  MYS 
A  -0.016  2.7226  0.647  8.718  22.581  11.404  -9.780  -18.182  2.343 (.21)  2.369 (.23)# 
L  0.0433  2.121  0.2193  12.631  15.517  6.765  -7.500  -14.706  1.961 (.29)  2.140 (.29)  PVD 
A  0.0222  2.0927  0.236  2.933  10.494  7.273  -6.406  -9.821  2.085 (.20)  2.079 (.21) 
L  0.0572  2.4335  0.014  12.963  18.182  9.677  -9.091  -19.149  2.116 (.31)  2.143 (.62)  BSB 
A  0.0538  2.749  -0.115  11.152  17.647  11.111  -11.215  -22.283  2.156 (.29)  2.284 (.35) 
L  -0.001  2.0333  -0.571  7.666  10.536  7.131  -9.343  -17.237  2.335 (.23)  2.774 (.37)#  SQM 
A  -0.001  2.0267  -0.520  7.496  11.350  7.379  -9.685  -17.907  2.103 (.20)  2.434 (.28) 
L  0.0270  2.3782  -0.274  8.778  12.245  8.597  -7.563  -15.349  2.139 (.22)  2.065 (.22)  ISA 
A  -0.001  2.8815   -0.914  19.046  16.260  12.503  -10.373  -28.358  1.879 (.24)  1.878 (.24) 
 
Notes: #: significantly different from 2. 
a+: right tail estimate 
a-: left tail estimate   21
TABLE 3. NON PARAMETRIC TWO-SAMPLE TESTS 
Comparisons of daily return distributions for locally traded stocks and their NYSE ADRs. The value for the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is KS and the asymptotic statistic is KSa (p-value in parenthesis). The value of the 
Wilcoxon Ranks Sums test is WS and its Z score WZ (p-value in parenthesis). The value of the Median Scores 
test is MS and its Z score MZ (p-value in parenthesis).  
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  Wilcoxon Rank Sums test  Median Scores (Number of Points 
Above Median) test 
Ticker  
KS  KSa  WS  WZ  MS  MZ 
 
ARGENTINA 
BFR  0.0200  0.707 
(0.699) 
390789  -.02328 
(0.981) 
306.777  -0.6767 
(0.497) 
BRS  .0107  .5954 
(0.870) 
2368066  0.3256 
(0.745) 
771.052  0.2280 
(0.8196) 
YPF  0.0166  0.9563 
(0.320) 
2747518  0.3997 
(0.6894) 
834.465  0.5426 
(0.5874) 
TAR  0.01631  0.0326 
(0.416) 
2161940  0.3331 
(0.739) 
740.476  0.5261 
(0.599) 
TEO  0.01266  0.02532 
(0.783) 
1809087  0.2372 
(0.813) 
675.289  0.3008 
(0.764) 
TGS  0.0313  1.5812 
(0.014)* 
1638493  -0.02935 
(0.977) 




CU  0.0427  2.3403* 
(0.0001) 
2093880  0.7270 
(0.4672) 
701.869  0.7575 
(0.4487) 
VCO  0.0515  2.2661* 
(0.0001) 
805584  0.3246 
(0.7455) 
431.000  1.6154 
(0.1062) 
CGW  0.0849  3.8184* 
(0.0001) 
768740  1.8665 
(0.0620) 
363.664  -.4371 
(0.6620) 
CTC  0.0282  1.7799* 
(0.0035) 
3622507  -.6919 
(0.4890) 
920.398  0.3025 
(0.7623) 
AED  0.0669  2.6833* 
(0.0001) 
627422  0.7720 
(0.4401) 
368.000  -1.7923 
(0.0731) 
EOC  0.0465  2.2212* 
(0.0001) 
1294676  0.5215 
(0.6020) 
540.000  -2.0016* 
(0.0453) 
ENI  0.0266  1.3702* 
(0.0468) 
1747092  0.0730 
(0.9418) 
627.000  -2.3383* 
(0.0194) 
LBC  0.0639  3.0537* 
(0.0001) 
1283095  0.6583 
(0.5103) 
573.000  1.4575 
(0.1450) 
MAD  0.0660  3.3619* 
(0.0001) 
1538042  1.8493 
(0.0644) 
577.681  -.0495 
(0.9605) 
MYS  0.0578  2.9912* 
(0.0001) 
1689726  0.8049 
(0.4209) 
598.750  -2.0635* 
(0.0391) 
PVD  0.0635  2.7361* 
(0.0001) 
740052  1.5879 
(0.1123) 
405.532  1.6611 
(0.0967) 






































•  * significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE 4. MEAN-VARIANCE RESULTS 
This table presents parameter estimates and test statistics for the equality tests. The regression coefficients are for 
the following joint means and variances equality test: 
yt = b0 + b1 DEVXt + et 
yt =  rJ, t - rUS, t 
x t =  rJ, t + rUS, t 
DEVXt = x t - x  
J = Argentina, Chile 
 
Equality test  Ticker  
constant  DEVXt  F-test 
 
ARGENTINA 
BFR  -0.025 (0.51)  -0.0103 (-1.29)  0.958 
BRS  -0.007 (0.11)  -0.033 (3.36)*  5.625* 
YPF  -0.013 (0.15)  -0.329 (1.40)  0.984 
TAR  0.001 (0.02)  -0.010 (0.79)  0.309 
TEO  0.016 (.46)  -0.001 (.15)  0.344 
TGS  -0.005 (0.09)  -0.006 (-0.50)  0.128 
 
CHILE 
CU  0.00027 (0.61)  -0.35342  (-3.27) *  5.348 * 
VCO  -0.00005 (-0.08)  -0.04399  (-2.25) *  2.538 * 
CGW  0.00034 (0.50)  -0.00395  (-0.22)  0.025 
CTC  0.00010 (0.33)  -0.03696  (-4.66) *  10.839 * 
AED  -0.00051 (-0.64)  0.02299  (1.15)  0.667 
EOC  0.000009 (0.02)  -0.05461  (-5.33) *  14.226 * 
ENI  0.00021 (0.53)  -0.04823  (-5.24) *  13.729 * 
LBC  0.00019 (0.32)  -0.03015  (-2.31) *  2.678 * 
MAD  0.00005 (0.07)  0.00421  (0.28)  0.039 
MYS  -0.00016 (-0.27)  -0.02305  (-1.86)  1.736 
PVD  0.00097 (1.36)  -0.00919  (-0.44)  0.096 
BSB  0.00051 (0.71)  -0.04745  (-2.48) *  3.079 * 
SQM  -0.00012 (-0.31)  0.02546  (2.65) *  3.524 * 
ISA  -0.00058 (-0.71)  -0.06303(-3.14) *  4.943 * 
 
Notes:  
* significant at the 5% level.  23
TABLE 5.  ESTIMATION OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
This table estimates the transaction costs of opening opposite positions in the locally traded shares and their 
ADRs, based on the following model: 
yt = aout + bout yt-1 + eout,t,   if |yt-1| > k 
yt = ain + bin yt-1 + ein,t,   if |yt-1| ￿ k   
yt =  rJ, t - rUS, t       
eout,t ~ N(0,s
2
out), ein,t ~ N(0,s
2
in). 
    J = Argentina, Chile 
 




out  k  Likelihood  # Obs. out  LST-F 
 
ARGENTINA 
BFR  -0.371 (.03)  1.169 (.03)  2.283 (.06)  0.84  2889.4  711 (46%)  19.18 (0.000) 
BRS  -0.489 (.04)  1.190 (.05)  1.611 (.06)  0.69  1095.9  348 (56%)  8.195 (0.000) 
YPF  -0.427 (.03)  1.681 (.04)  3.177 (.09)  1.63  3548.1  548 (33%)  13.40 (0.000) 
TAR  -0.419 (.04)  1.457 (.03)  3.869 (.13)  1.59  3042.3  425 (29%)  22.05 (0.000) 
TEO  -0.438 (.04)  0.958 (.03)  1.400 (.09)  0.66  2087.6  639 (48%)  16.44 (0.000) 
TGS  -.370 (.03)  1.589 (.04)  2.231 (.07)  1.41  2675.3  486 (38%)  18.31 (0.000) 
 
CHILE 
CU  -0.343 (.03)  1.326 (.04)  1.501 (.05)  0.82  1758.1  530 (53%)  6.82 (0.000) 
VCO  -0.238 (.04)  1.73 (.05)  2.37 (.10)  1.98  1916.9  240 (26%)  5.47 (0.000) 
CGW  -0.244 (.05)  1.606 (.04)  2.650 (.13)  1.76  1849.5  225 (24%)  8.44 (0.000) 
CTC  -0.269 (.03)  1.062 (.02)  1.612 (.04)  0.87  3439.9  765 (36%)  9.61 (0.000) 
AED  -0.332 (.05)  1.530 (.05)  3.398 (.15)  1.47  1645.1  233 (29%)  14.72 (0.000) 
EOC  -0.334 (.04)  1.040 (.03)  1.597 (.07)  1.31  1758.1  272 (24%)  14.67 (0.000) 
ENI  -0.359 (.04)  1.124 (.02)  1.692 (.07)  1.40  2142.9  286 (22%)  9.61 (0.000) 
LBC  -.340 (.04)  1.657 (.04)  3.190 (.11)  1.99  2266.7  268 (24%)  8.17 (0.000) 
MAD  -0.310 (.03)  1.716 (.04)  2.356 (.07)  1.70  2679.0  355 (28%)  19.46 (0.000) 
MYS  -0.310 (.03)  1.716 (.04)  2.356 (.12)  1.46  2757.6  525 (40%)  13.86 (0.000) 
PVD  -0.303 (.05)  1.578 (.04)  2.697 (.12)  1.74  1794.4  253 (28%)  14.12 (0.000) 
BSB  -0.303 (.04)  1.613 (.05)  2.654 (.09)  1.02  1988.8  456 (49%)  10.83 (0.000) 
SQM  -0.312 (.03)  1.108 (.03)  1.491 (.04)  0.90  2704.8  645 (39%)  13.08 (0.000) 
ISA  -0.313 (.05)  1.771 (.05)  3.450 (.12)  0.87  1690.3  206 (26%)  29.28 (0.000) 
 
Notes: 
# Obs. out: Number of observations outside the threshold. 
LST-F: Lukkonnen, Saikkonen, and Terarsvirta’s (1988) nonlinear F-test (p-value in parenthesis).   24
TABLE 6. AUTOCORRELATIONS FOR THE RETURN DIFFERENCE SERIES 
This table presents autocorrelations for the return difference between locally traded shares and their 
NYSE-traded ADRs (t-values are presented in parenthesis).  
FIRM  AUTOCORRELATION        LAG 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
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TABLE 7.  ARBITRAGE ACTIVITIES FOR CHILEAN FIRMS 
This table summarizes the activities involved in arbitrage operations for Chilean firms. Transaction 
costs are approximate and vary according to the agent performing arbitrage and the time period. 
 
 
 USD PRICE OF LOCAL SHARE LOWER THAN ADR PRICE 
 
  ACTION  TIME  TRANSACTION  COST 
1  Inflow of dollars into Chile and conversion 
into CLP (approval by Central Bank) 
up to T+7  ½ spread + commission at FX market  
(1%) 
2  Buy shares at local exchange  T+2  ½ spread + commission at local exchange 
(1.5%) 
3  Convert shares into ADRs  ?  fee to custodian bank 
4  Sell ADRs at NYSE  T+2 ?  ½ spread + commission at NYSE  (0. 5%) 
 
ADR PRICE LOWER THAN USD PRICE OF LOCAL SHARE 
 
  ACTION  TIME  TRANSACTION  COST 
1  Buy NYSE ADR  T+2  ½ spread + commission at NYSE (0.5%)  
2  Convert ADR into shares    fee to custodian bank 
3  Sell shares at local exchange  T+2  ½ spread + commission at lo cal exchange 
(1.5%) 
4  Convert CLP into USD and dollar outflow 
(requires Central Bank’s approval) 
up to  
T+7 
 










•  Unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) of 20% on foreign loans 
•  Minimum holding period of between 3 and 12 months on foreign loans 
1992   
January  •   URR is extended to local deposits denominated in a foreign currency  
May  •  Minimum holding period of one year for all types of foreign investment except 
ADRs 
August  •  URR is increased to 30% and extended to all types of foreign investment 
1995   
July  •  URR is extended to secondary ADRs 




•  Foreign loans for amounts smaller than USD200,000 are exempted from URR 




•  Foreign loans for amounts smaller than USD100,000 are exempted from URR 
(maximum of USD100,00 per year) 
1998   
June  •  URR is reduced to 10% 
August  •  URR for secondary ADRs is eliminated 




•  Minimum holding period for foreign investments is eliminated   26
 